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Abstract
Anti-forensic techniques are increasingly being used by malware writers to avoid detection and analysis of their
malicious code. Penalties for writing malware could include termination of employment, fines or even,
imprisonment. Malware writers are motivated not to get caught and are actively using subversive techniques to
avoid forensic analysis. Techniques employed include obfuscation, anti-disassembly, encrypted and compressed
data, data destruction and anti-debugging. Automated detection and classification work is progressing in this
field. This includes analysing statistical structures such as assembly instructions, system calls, system
dependence graphs and classification through machine learning.
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INTRODUCTION
Forensic analysis of software that is determined to be malicious could result in the termination and/or
prosecution of the author and/or the user of the code who knows its true malicious purpose. This could include
logic bombs, viruses, worms, backdoors and trojans. There is no doubt that forensic analysis of software takes
time and money. It is to the advantage of the malware author, or deliberate user, that the investigation takes
longer than management is prepared to spend on the investigation. Conceivably, the malware author or user
would like the malicious component to go completely undetected, and avoid the risk of prosecution.
Scenarios could include programmers writing salami attack style code to assist embezzlement through altering
billing algorithms to redirect funds to their own accounts. Programmers could include a backdoor into software
so that they can perform some malicious action at a time of their own choosing. Covert channel methods of
communication could be implemented into code so that information can be passed out from an organization
undetected. The scenarios are boundless.
Malware can incorporate various techniques to not only avoid forensic detection, but can also avoid forensic
analysis. Grugq (n.d.) refers to this as “anti-forensics” and suggests that there are 3 fundamental ways of
achieving this. Namely:
•
•
•

Data Destruction
Data Hiding
Data Contraception

Essentially data destruction means deleting file residue such as inodes, directory entries and data blocks. It also
includes deleting file system activity though inode time stamps. Data hiding means putting data where it is not
expected to be. This can include storing data in blocks that have been marked as bad. Data contraception means
making sure data is never stored on the disk. Grugq implies that it is better to never have created the data in the
first place than having to destroy it.
Forensic analysis avoidance techniques can include, but are not limited to:
•
•
•
•

Exploiting flaws in analysis tools.
Attempting system destruction when being analysed.
Generation of false disassembly listings.
Subversion of disassembler heuristics.

This paper analyses these techniques to show how they can be recognised so that forensic analysis can be
performed. This treatment is far from exhaustive, and serves merely as an introduction to the techniques
employed to avoid forensic analysis of malicious software. The background section of this paper shows how
reverse engineering techniques are typically used for the forensic analysis of malware binaries. This analysis can
be either static or active. Static analysis is used to analyse the binary without executing it, whilst active analysis
requires the execution of the binary and studying its behaviour. This paper then moves into how such reverse
engineering analysis techniques can be avoided by the malware writer. The final section of this paper then looks
at automated malware classification techniques that are currently being developed. This is because commercial
virus scanners will be very unlikely to detect the presence of customized, or purpose built malware.
For the purpose of this paper, legal issues surrounding the reverse engineering of software is ignored. It is
assumed that the software that is being examined is the intellectual property of the organization that will have
authorised this activity, or that the investigative team is authorised to conduct the investigation in some other
way.

BACKGROUND
Evidence Elimination
Penalities for hacking and writing malware are increasing. Awareness of hacking is rising within the community
as well as forensic analysis techniques and methodologies. It is in the interest of hackers and malware writers to
work against forensic investigators and eliminate forensic evidence. They have the motivation, the opportunity
and now the methods to defeat forensic analysis. Kotadia (2006) reported in an online article that a speaker at
the IT Security in Government Conference held in Canberra in July 2006 claimed that 65% of new malware
“uses some type of stealth or anti-forensic technology in an attempt to remain undetected before, during and
after an attack”.
Static Analysis
Various techniques used for static analysis include “information gathering, disassembly, symbol table
regeneration, decompilation techniques, and methodologies for determining the order of decompiling
subroutines” (The Honeynet Project, 2004, p.452). These techniques are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Information Gathering
Information can be gathered from a binary using various tools. The “file” command can provide the file format
and identify the target platform. Use of the “ldd” command can give information on dynamic link libraries
required for the code to run. Embedded strings can be found in the binaries by using the “strings” command.
The “hexdump” command with appropriate switches can do this too, as well as listing the name and version of
the compiler used. Symbols can be listed by using the “nm” command. The language used to write the program
can be determined by various characteristics found in the binary. This can include the way the strings in the
binary are terminated, how data arrays are stored, how subroutines are called and the order of storing parameters
on the stack.
Disassembly
The process of disassembly is used to create a more readable version of the binary. Typical programs in the
Linux environment include ndisasm and objdump. Peikari and Chuvakin (2004, p.51) point out that objdump
provides a sequential disassembly, and “no attempt is made to reconstruct the flow of the target”. It also cannot
cope with binaries that have had their section headers removed, or that are invalid. This can be done by the tool
“sstrip” which is discussed later. The Honeynet project (2004, p. 456) also point out that compiled programs
usually put the data in the data segment, and the code in the code segment, but it is possible that data can be
treated like code and code may be treated as data. Heuristics are used by disassemblers to separate code from
data, and more professional disassemblers such as IDA Pro can trace program flow by using signature based
heuristics.

Symbol Table Regeneration

The “nm” command can be used in the linux environment to list symbols in object files. This is useful because
the addresses of functions in programs can then be located and then analysed. More than likely, the malicious
software writer will have used the “strip” command to remove all symbols from the object file. Programs can be
either statically or dynamically linked. If dynamically linked, external library calls can be identified, however, if
statically linked, all external routines are combined into the binary when compiled. This makes it impossible to
distinguish external routines from linked libraries from the routines written by the programmer. The Honeynet
Project (2004, p.458) say that “An ideal solution would be to recreate a symbol table containing the mapping of
library names to addresses so that only the user code needs to be analysed”. They go on to say that a database of
signatures could be created from subroutines from all known libraries. Then, to recreate the symbol table and
insert it back into the program, the signatures could be matched against the code being examined. Then, external
routines can be factored out, leaving only the code written by the malware writer to be examined.
Decompilation Techniques
Decompilation is the action of transforming the results of a disassembly back into a high level language. The
process works basically by understanding how particular compilers work in the first place to generate the object
code, with particular consideration of how optimisations can take place. After disassembly, the entry points to
all functions can be determined. Usually this is done by searching the disassembly for calls to absolute
addresses. Subroutines can also be identified by common header and footer signatures. Analysis of each
subroutine can then begin. This can consist of recognising flow control structures such as loops, conditional
evaluation and branches. Parameters passed to and from these routines can also be determined, as well as other
statements and assignments.

Active Analysis
Active analysis techniques listed by the Honeynet Project (2004, p. 464) include sandboxing the analysis
environment, blackbox analysis and tracing. These techniques are discussed below.
Sandboxing the Analysis Environment
The Honeynet Project (2004, p.464) emphasises that “It would be foolish to execute the program on a
production system or one connected to a live network”. They go on to recommend that the ideal place to
perform active analysis would be on the honeynet on which it was captured from. It would be expected that local
and remote logging would be in place already, and network packet capture is available. The analyst should have
super user privileges so that kernel modules can be loaded and unloaded, system logs can be examined, file
system images saved and restored and routing tables modified. They also recommend a wide variety of
debuggers are available. This is because if different debuggers give different results, it would indicate that the
malware is most likely targeting specific debuggers with avoidance techniques.
Other types of sandboxes include hard and soft virtual machines. A typical soft virtual machine is vmware
which allows the investigator to take snapshots of the system state at any time and restore that particular state.
This makes it very easy to repeat an analysis from a known point. Another advantage is that vmware allows the
establishment of virtual networks, that can be confined from the host. This enables the investigator to observe
the network behaviour of malware in a sandboxed environment.
Blackbox Analysis
Blackbox testing in software engineering means testing software without knowing how the internals work. The
focus is on state, by varying inputs and recording outputs. If a program is in an endless loop, it could indicate
that the process is a daemon. Possibly the process is waiting for a network event such as a connection. It should
also be possible to determine which files have been accessed by the process by examining file system states and
access time stamps. It should also be possible to capture network packets using tools such as ethereal. It should
also be possible to determine if any child processes were forked.

Tracing

Tracing provides a more internal view than does blackbox analysis by tracing system calls, library calls and
internal calls. Linux provides the “strace” program that is used. “strace works by intercepting and recording the
system calls used by a process and the signals it receives. For each system call, the name, arguments and return
value are printed to standard error (stderr) or to a file specified” Frye (2005). This is really useful, because it is
possible to see the names and paths of files accessed and in which mode, system calls, shared libraries it needs,
as well as many other parameters. It is possible too to attach to a running process

DETECTION AND ANALYSIS AVOIDANCE
Obfuscation
A paper by Christoderescu and Jha (2003) show how effectively obfuscation techniques such as dead-code
insertion, code transposition and instruction substitution can defeat commercial virus scanners. One of the
simple tests was to insert nop codes into the Chernobyl virus. They show that the Norton Anti-Virus software
did not detect this obfuscated virus.
Two common techniques used by malware writers to avoid detection through obfuscation are polymorphism and
metamorphism (Christoderescu, Jha, Seisha, Song, Bryant, n.d., p.1 ). A virus can use polymorphism to avoid
detection by decrypting its encrypted malicious payload when it is being executed. “A polymorphic virus
obfuscates its decryption loop using several transformations, such as nop-insertion, code transposition (changing
the order of instructions and placing jump instructions to maintain the original semantics), and register
reassignment (permuting the register allocation)” (Christoderescu et.al., n.d., p.1.). A metamorphic virus
changes the code a number of different ways when it replicates. This can include code transposition, changing
conditional jumps, register reassignment and substitution of equivalent instruction sequences.
These techniques need not remain in the domain of self replicating viruses. These techniques can be used in any
malicious software to hide its presence through obfuscation. Most worms and viruses are variations of an
original virus or worm and signatures are soon determined once they have been detected in the wild. There is no
doubt that these techniques can be used by the hacker to create a single version instance of malware customised
to perform some malicious act within the company in which they are employed as a software or network
engineer. They may use these techniques to deliberately obfuscate its function. The 2003 paper by
Christoderescu et.al. points out that most malware detectors are easily defeated by obfuscation because they use
pattern matching and that they are not resilient to slight variations. They go on to say that pattern matching
ignores the semantics of instructions.
By being able to run a semantics focused parser over suspicious binaries under forensic examination, it could be
possible to determine which binaries have a malicious intent. It could help the forensics investigator to filter out
binaries of interest faster. The sections that follow discuss techniques used to avoid detection and analysis.
Understanding the basic mechanics of these techniques will not only help the forensic analyst detect these
techniques but should also assist in developing automated malware classification programs.
Anti-disassembly
By knowing that disassemblers use signature based heuristics, malware can be written to trick a particular
disassembler into producing an incorrect disassembly for the binary.
Library calls can be made to be hard to identify by using static linking. The disassembler has to be able to match
library function signatures.
A paper written by Linn and Debray (n.d.) describes algorithms that can be used to improve resistance of
programs to static disassembly through obfuscation. Their focus is on providing security to protect intellectual
property, stop piracy, and identification of breaches through making the disassembling process difficult. The
same principles can be used by the malware writer equally well to hide their own intentions. Linn et.al.’s goal is
to make the cost of reconstructing the high level structure too high, which is exactly the motivation of the
malware writer as well. They say “In order to thwart a disassembler, we have to somehow confuse, as much as
possible, its notion of where the instruction boundaries in a program lie” (Linn et.al., n.d., p.3). Methods
discussed in their paper include introducing disassembly errors that “repair themselves” and injection of “junk
bytes” into the instruction stream. These techniques are reliant upon the type of instruction set of the processor,
and on the type of sweep of the disassembler. That is whether the disassembler performs a linear sweep or a
recursive traversal. A weakness of a linear sweep algorithm is that it is subject to errors if data is embedded in
the instruction stream. Such a disassembler is aware of disassembly errors only if an invalid opcode is found. It

does not allow for the control flow behaviour of the code. A recursive traversal algorithm does take into account
the control flow behaviour of the code. However a “weakness is that its key assumption, that we can precisely
identify the set of control flow successors of each control transfer operation in the program, may not always
hold in the case of indirect jumps” (Linn et.al. n.d., p.3). Another technique they use for inserting junk bytes is
what they refer to as jump table spoofing. They do this to mislead recursive traversal disassembly.
Fundamentally, the idea is to make the code addresses in the jump table to addresses in the text segment, which
do not correspond to instructions and hence create disassembly errors.

Encrypted Data
Packers
Miras and Steele (2005, p.20) explain that packers compress executable programs in the objective of making the
task of reverse engineering as difficult as possible. A packed program contains a stub that is used for
decompressing the compressed data. The executable is decompressed during loading. Popular packers used in the
Windows environment that use PE format files include PECompact, UPX, ASPack and Armadillo. Packers use
various techniques to subvert forensic analysis. These include:
• Built in anti-debugging.
• Insertion of junk code.
• Abuse of exception coding.
• Trick disassemblers by jumping into longer instructions.
Packer detection methods include examining signature and heuristics. An effective signature based method is to
compare the program entry point against a database. Heuristical methods include seeing how the byte
distribution (entropy) is changed by the packers as well as checking import tables.
Burneye
Burneye “is an executable and linking format (ELF) encryption tool that limits forensics tools’ reverseengineering capabilities by protecting the binary program. Burneye users can manipulate executable code so
only an attacker with a password can run the program” (Saita, 2003). A loadable kernel module called
burndump can be used to remove burneye from binaries. Another tool that detects the use of burneye is called
bindview. Burncrack is a cracker that works with the John the Ripper program that can crack and unwrap
burneye protected binaries without having to run them. This would be a very useful tool when required to
perform a forensic analysis of the malware.

Data Destruction
The purpose behind data destruction is to leave nothing useful for a forensics investigator, effectively removing
all trace of evidence. The Defiler’s Toolkit is a set of programs whose purpose is to prevent forensic analysis,
specifically targeting the ext2fs filesystem, commonly found on linux systems. Necrofile is one of the programs
on the Defiler’s Toolkit for this purpose. Ordinarily, when a file is deleted, the inode and directory entries,
known as the metadata are left untouched. A forensic investigator will look at the metadata to see if the
supposedly erased data can be recovered. Necrofile can remove this metadata making it extremely difficult for
the investigator to recover files. Klismafile is another program in the toolkit that removes directory entries of
filenames that have been deleted. Through the use of these programs, forensic evidence can be removed. It
would not be inconceivable for malicious code to perform these two actions autonomously if it detected that
forensic analysis was being perfomed.
Data Hiding
The purpose of data hiding is to hide evidence from the forensic investigator, and is only successful if the
investigator does not know where to look for the evidence.
In the past, knowing that tools such as The Coroner’s Toolkit (TCT) did not look at bad blocks on a disk drive
that was using the Second Extended File System (ext2fs), an attacker could use the bad blocks inode to include
good blocks, and hide data there. Ordinarily, the bad blocks inode only points to bad blocks, and these blocks
will not be used for files. It is advisable to make sure that TCT’s more recent version (TASK) is used and that
bad blocks on a disk are also investigated (Skoudis, 2003). There is no doubt that this is a bit dated, but the point
should be clear that flaws can be found in the forensics tools, and most likely will continue to be found as tools
are improved and developed.

Data Contraception
Grugq (n.d.) says that the two core principles of data contraception are to prevent data from being written to
disk, operating purely in memory and to use common tools rather than custom tools. The idea is to limit the
value of any evidence that does touch the disk. Rootkits can operate in memory and “use ptrace() to attach to an
existing process and inject code into it’s address space. Additionally, injecting kernel modules directly into the
kernel is also a well known technique” (Grugq, n.d.).
Grugq recommends using common utilities such as rexec, which remotely executes a command on a remote
host. This allows the malware or hacker to never have to write anything to disk.
Antidebugging
A common debugger used in the linux environment is gdb. If a program has been compiled with the option to
produce debugging information, it could be possible to hide malicious intent, such as a logic bomb. The
following code, ptrace.c demonstrates this.
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
if (ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 1, 0) < 0) {
printf(“Debugging detected, goodbye!\n”);
return 1;
}
printf(‘Malicious purpose here.”);
return 0;
}
The program is compiled with the following command:
gcc –o ptrace ptrace.c –g
When run at the command line, the program will print the following line.
Malicious purpose here.
When run inside gdb, it will print
Debugging detected, goodbye!
Hopefully, this sort of thing will be picked up in a peer review, or some other audit activity, but could be missed
by an inexperienced auditor, or an auditor not focussing on security. The code could even be in a library that is
not in version control and is going to be linked in, in a nightly build. It is possible to hide the approach even
more by replacing the call to ptrace with an int 80 system call with inline assembly (Peikari et.al., 2004, p.69).
The ptrace trick can be overcome by setting breakpoints at the start and the end of the subroutine that calls
ptrace (The Honeynet Project, 2004, p.469). Then when running in the debugger, the return value from the call
to ptrace is changed from failure to success.
Compression Bombs
Compression bombs “are files that have been repeatedly compressed, typically dozens or hundreds of times”
(NIST, 2006, p.45). They can cause forensic tools used for examination to fail, or use up so many resources that
the computer may hang or crash. It is possible that they may contain a malicious payload. NIST (2006, p45)
suggest it could be very difficult to detect a compression bomb before it is uncompressed. However it is very
important to be working on the forensic image, so that the system can be restored if required. It is also suggested
by NIST (2006, p45) that a virus scanner may detect the bomb. But this is reliant upon signatures being kept up
to date, and also that the bomb has been in the wild for a while, and that anti virus companies have analysed it
before. More of a concern, would be a one off, customised compression bomb that would not be recognised by
its signature and could be effected once malicious software determines that an investigation is taking place.

AUTOMATED MALWARE DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
Malware detection and analysis by an investigator can be a labor intensive process using static and active
techniques. Due to time constraints and the abilities of the investigator, there is a possibility that critical forensic
evidence could be overlooked. To this end, automated malware detection and classification tools are being
developed.
A presentation by Bilar (2005) shows how malware can be classified by analyzing statistical structures. Three
perspectives are examined by Bilar, including Assembly Instructions, Win 32 API Calls and System
Dependence Graphs. Examination of Assembly Instructions is primarily a static analysis technique where the
frequency distribution of opcodes are developed from the disassembly of the binary. Bilar shows that this
technique can be useful to provide a quick identification. Just looking at the most frequent opcodes is a weak
predictor. Looking at fourteen of the most infrequently used opcodes such as int and nop it may be possible to
classify malware. Bilar suggests that root kits make heavy use of software interrupts, and viruses make use of
nop for padding sleds. Additional work being carried out in this area includes investigating equivalent opcode
substitution effects, and association effects between compilers and types of opcodes.
Tracking Win 32 API Calls is an active analysis technique that observes the API calls that a program under
investigation makes. These calls are recorded and a count vector is saved into a database. These vectors are then
compared to known malware vectors in the database, and it is determined if the vectors are related. Bilar (p.25)
claims that this vector classification is successful in classification of malware into a family. The Win 32 API call
fingerprint is shown by Bilar (p.27) to be robust, even though various packers were used.
System Dependence Graphs is a newly developing static analysis technique described by Bilar (p.31) that
represents control, call and data dependencies of a program through graph modeling. Then graph structures can
be used as fingerprints, which assist in the process of identification, classification and prediction of behaviour.
Lee and Mody “propose an automated classification method based on runtime behavioral data and machine
learning” (2006, p.3). Essentially the run time behaviour of a file is represented by a sequence of events which is
stored in a canonical format in a database. Machine learning is used to recognize patterns and similarities which
are then used to classify new objects.

CONCLUSION:
This paper has shown how forensic analysis can be avoided using techniques used by the writers of malicious
software. It has been reported that malware is increasingly using these techniques to avoid forensic analysis,
and that the majority of new malware is incorporating these techniques. A number of avoidance techniques were
discussed including obfuscation, anti-disassembly, encrypted and compressed data, data destruction and antidebugging. This list of techniques is far from exhaustive. These techniques need not remain in the domain of
mass distributed malware such as worms and viruses. They could be developed primarily for a one off,
malicious mission of performing some malicious act within a company, collection of commercially sensitive
data or other equally criminal activities.
Automated detection and classification work is progressing in this field. This includes analysing statistical
structures such as assembly instructions, system calls, system dependence graphs and classification through
machine learning.
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